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Several emerging capital markets have adopted legally separated share markets (LSSM) in which 
local firms market separate claims to the same underlying dividend flow to two distinct sets of investors, 
domestic shareholders who can only buy “A” shares with domestic currency and foreign investors who can 
only buy “B” shares with foreign currency.  Legal restrictions prevent arbitrage across these markets.  
But field studies document covariance in the price movements of these assets with changes in the 
price of “A” shares preceding changes in the price of “B’ shares.  The natural explanation for the 
covariance in A and B shares’ price movements is the notion that people trading in LSSM tend to read 
information from the price movements in one market as a relevant assessment of the fundamental factors of 
the asset they are trading in the other market.  However, since any private information reflected in market 
prices of an asset is unobservable by an analyst, it is impossible to provide a direct test of this hypothesis 
using field data.  A laboratory experiment is conducted to test the hypothesis that both (i) the price of an 
asset that is traded in a market where there are some ‘informed’ traders will reflect that information and (ii) 
the price of an asset with the same state-dependent dividend that is traded in a legally separated market 
with no informed traders will also reflect the same information.  We find that the information held by 
insiders does get reflected in the asset price of the market in which the informed traders participate.   
Furthermore, this information does get reflected with a lag in the price of the asset traded in the market in 
which no informed traders participate.  The effectiveness of the transference of information depends on 
whether or not the location of the informed traders is public knowledge and on the quality and clarity of the 
signal imbedded in the price movements in the market in which the informed traders participate.  
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1.  Introduction 
Foreign share ownership restrictions have been a common practice at different 
times in almost all emerging capital markets.
1  They come in various forms to protect 
domestic industries while serving the purpose of attracting foreign capital.  Several 
countries with emerging capital markets have adopted legally separated share markets 
(LSSM) in which local firms can market separate claims to the same underlying dividend 
flow to two distinct sets of investors, domestic shareholders who can buy “A” shares with 
domestic currency and foreign investors who can only buy “B” shares with foreign 
currency.  For example, in China, local firms issue “A” shares to Chinese citizens who 
can only trade “A” shares with Chinese currency, Yuan;
2 firms can also issue “B” shares 
to foreign investors who can only trade “B” shares with U.S. currency.
3  “A” and “B” 
shares carry the same economic and voting rights. 
As an empirical fact, prices of these assets diverge.  This would provide arbitrage 
opportunities if there were no legal restrictions of the trading of these assets.  However, 
restrictions on the percentage of capital that can be raised by the sale of “B” shares, 
together with prohibition of foreigners purchasing “A” shares and of domestic investors 
buying “B” shares prevent any opportunity for arbitrage across these two market claims 
                                                 
1 For example, the Restrictions Act of 1939 significantly limited foreign shareholdings in Finnish 
companies.  The law differentiated between restricted shares, which only Finns were permitted to own, and 
nonrestricted shares, which were available to foreigners.  Philippine stock market and Mexican stock 
market also have different restrictions on foreign share ownership at different times. 
2 Since February 19, 2001, Chinese investors who already had a foreign currency savings account were also 
allowed to trade “B” shares.   Most countries with LSSM design in their capital markets relax restrictions 
on foreign share ownership gradually.  Our study is based on the initial forms and features of LSSM where 
there is still strict separation between domestic and foreign investors. 
3 “B” shares listed in Shanghai Stock Exchanges are traded with U.S. currency while “H” shares listed in 
the other stock exchange in China – Shenzhen Stock Exchanges are traded with Hong Kong dollars. 
  2to the same dividend flow.
4  Nevertheless, previous studies have documented the 
covariance in A and B shares’ price movements (Kim and Shin 2000, Chui and Kwok 
1998, and Chakaravarty, Sarkar and Wu 1998).  This has led a number of scholars to 
attempt to provide an explanation for the difference in pricing of these two classes of 
shares and the share price co-movements.  Empirical work with field data using 
implications of CAPM models (Fernald and Rogers 2002) has attempted to account for 
the divergence in prices of “A” and “B” shares on the basis of difference in risk 
premiums.   This approach implies that the difference in risk premiums should be the 
same across different companies.  However, this implication is not consistent with 
empirical data
5.  Furthermore, because these markets are legally separated, traders in 
these different markets may have different optimal portfolios even if they have the same 
risk attitudes. Consequently, there is no theoretical reason to expect that “A” and “B” 
shares will be priced identically.
6   
While there are good theoretical reasons to believe that shares traded in LSSM 
need not have the same price level in equilibrium, what remains to be explained is the 
covariance observed in the price movements of these shares.  It is this phenomenon to 
which this research is directed. 
                                                 
4 However, there have been reports indicating domestic capital flows trading “B” shares.  Chinese citizens 
can ask overseas relatives to open an account to trade “B” shares.  But there is no close estimate of the 
scale of such activities. 
5 See Li Qi (2004), section 3.4.1, “Three Essays on Emerging Capital Markets,” Unpublished Dissertation, 
available via http://sslvpn.pitt.edu/dissertations/,DanaInfo=wwwlib.umi.com+ 
6 Optimal portfolio theory implies that the price of any one share depends not only upon its own dividend 
flow but also upon the characteristics of the dividend flows of other assets that individuals may purchase.  
Since foreign investors and domestic investors have distinct sets of assets from which they can compose 
their portfolios, optimal portfolio theory provides a basis for accounting for differences in the prices for 
“A” shares and “B” shares.  Although it is difficult to implement purely empirical tests on this hypothesis, 
there has been some experimental evidence to support the prediction of asset pricing of optimal portfolio 
theories.  For example, Bossaerts, Plott and Zame (2003) show that asset prices are consistent with the 
predictions of portfolio theories (although portfolio choices diverge from choice predictions of the same 
theories). 
  3Traders in LSSM may not value the same dividend flows in the same way, but 
they are both equally interested in the dividend flows.  Generally those dividend flows 
are, at best, known probabilistically.  However, some individuals may have better 
information than others as to the nature of this dividend flow.  Therefore, all traders may 
be attempting to infer what the best information is from price movements in both 
markets.  Indeed the market efficiency hypothesis implies that in equilibrium, the price of 
“A” and “B” shares will fully reflect the best available information.  It is this hypothesis 
that we wish to test. 
2.  Research Motivation 
Studies that empirically identify the correlation between “A” and “B” share price 
co-movements (Kim and Shin 2000, Chui and Kwok 1998) have attempted to identify 
lead-lag relationship as a way of suggesting the direction of information flow.  For 
example, Chui and Kwok (1998) use daily prices of “A” and “B” shares and demonstrate 
the lead-leg effect between these two types of shares is robust.  They explain their 
findings as follows: “since B-share investors have better information than A-share 
investors, the latter tend to gain more information from the trading of B shares for the 
same stock.  The direction of information flow is mainly from the price of B shares to the 
price of A shares.  As a result, the returns on B shares lead the returns on the A shares.”   
Although this explanation is plausible it is difficult to test with field data because 
the outside observer does not know what information about the underlying fundamentals 
that determine future dividend flows is possessed by the various traders in the asset 
markets. Thus, due to the limitations inherent in the field data studies, the explanation for 
the lead-lag relationship mentioned above is inevitably conjectural.     
  4However, in a laboratory experiment the “fundamentals” which, according to 
asset pricing theory, determine asset prices are chosen by the experimenter and can be 
used directly in testing hypotheses about asset pricing.  For this reason, we utilize 
laboratory experiments in which the experimenter knows the actual distribution of 
information among market participants to study the use and transference of information 
across legally separated share markets.   
3.  Literature Review 
The test of our hypothesis on the impact of how information that might appear in 
one market gets transmitted to another market is a test of market efficiency.  The price 
co-movement phenomenon is closely related to the hypothesis that the market price 
reflects the best available information, which is the central implication of the claim that 
asset markets are efficient.  There has been some experimental support for this claim.   
Previous experimental studies with regard to information transmission in a single 
market (that is, a single group of traders) have focused on two types of situations: one is 
that information “insiders” hold perfect knowledge of what the state will be; the other is 
that no individual knows exactly what the true state is but if private information were 
aggregated, the true state will be revealed.   
Plott and Sunder (1982) conducted an experiment in which a market currency 
could be traded for a one-period asset.  The dividend paid to a holder of a unit of this 
asset at the end of a trading period depended on both the agent’s type and on the 
realization of a state variable drawn from a commonly known distribution of possible 
values.  The value of the state variable was drawn at the beginning of the trading period 
and was made known to a fraction of all traders (“insiders”).  If the information possessed 
by the insiders did not ‘leak’ out to the market as a whole then the prices at which the 
  5asset traded would be independent of the true state.  Conversely, if the information held 
by the informed traders were fully reflected in the market price for the asset then the 
market price would vary with the value of the state variable and all of the stock of the 
asset would tend to be held by that type of agent who received the highest dividend 
payoff when that state was realized.  Plott and Sunder found that, as subjects gained  
experience, market prices tended to track the fully revealing rational expectations 
equilibrium prices and that asset holdings also tended to be concentrated in the hands of 
those agents who had the largest realized state-dependent dividends.  
In the case of partial private insider information, information aggregation is 
observed under some, but not all conditions.  Plott and Sunder (1988) studied markets 
where traders had different information and the information structure was collectively 
complete; that is, traders’ collective information completely identified each trader’s 
payoff.  In sessions where only one asset is traded they found no evidence of information 
aggregation.  However, when there was a complete set of Arrow/Debreu securities that 
could be traded, information aggregation took place. In the Plott and Sunder (1988) 
experiments each subject knew only his own payoff function. Forsythe and Lundholm 
(1990) examined the extent to which markets actually aggregate and transmit information 
when there is common knowledge of the payoff functions for all types of agents and 
when every subject is given the opportunity to play all roles.  They find that common 
trading experience and common knowledge of dividends are jointly sufficient to achieve 
a rational expectation equilibrium when a single asset is traded and aggregate information 
is complete. But information aggregation does not work well in complicated 
environments.  Studies extending the possible number of states governing dividend 
  6payoffs (O’Brien and Srivastava 1991 tested information aggregation with six possible 
states), and number of securities simultaneously traded fail to observe information 
aggregation.  Moreover, recent studies also show the possibility of “information trap” – a 
sort of equilibrium in which information existing in the market does not become revealed 
in prices (Noeth, Camerer, Plott and Webber 1999).  These efforts are designed to test the 
limits of the market information aggregation.  Most of the extensions have been in the 
direction of reaching more complicated environments such as number of possible states 
and securities.   
The process and impact of information revelation (or aggregation) across 
segmented markets, which applies to many markets in real economies, have not been 
studied.  Will the power of simple environments, in which information transmission has 
been proved to exist, also support information transmission across separated markets 
where assets have claims to the same dividend flow?  This is the question to which our 
experiment is addressed. 
4.   Experimental Design 
4.1.  The Environment 
 
We recruited subjects for a computerized double auction asset market game.  The 
subjects were divided into two groups:  the domestic (A) player group and the foreign (B) 
player group.  Members of each group trade amongst themselves, but cannot trade with 
members of the other group.  While a given subject can trade in only one of the markets, 
all subjects see on their screens the activity in both markets.    
In this experiment, each group has two assets: one asset, labeled either ‘A’ or ‘B,’ 
pays a state-dependent dividend. The other asset is a trading currency that pays a 
  7dividend independent of state.  At the beginning of a trading period each subject is 
endowed with 10 units of stock (either A or B, depending on which group to which they 
belong) and 3500 units of trading currency.  Each asset pays its dividend at the end of 
each trading period.  Each asset has a one period life.  At the end of a market period the 
assets have no redemption value.  The stochastic process generating the state at the end of 
each trading period is public knowledge, as is the state-dependent dividend paid by each 
asset to each type of trader.  In each market, there are two different types of traders who 
are distinguished by the different payoffs received for the realized state.  It is common 
knowledge that the distribution of types of subjects is the same in both groups.   
Therefore, the fully revealing equilibrium is the same in both groups.      
Table 1 shows the stochastic process and the payoffs paid for assets A, B and the 
trading currency for different types of traders in both groups.  
Table 1 Dividends and Payoff Information 
    
Dividends of A & B  
 
(in franc) for TYPE X 
 
Dividends of A & B 
 
(in franc) for TYPE Y 
Return on money  
(in franc) for both 
TYPE X&Y 
1 θ  = Probability of 
state I observed: .5 
300 150 1 
2 θ  = Probability of 




The payoff function for an agent of type i in period t is 















i R    = dollar earnings of individual i in period t, 
t
i x    = asset units held by i at the end of period t, which is the sum of initial 
endowment of assets plus purchases less sales in period t, 
() θ i d    = dividend paid in francs for individual i and expressed as a function of 
the state of nature θ , 
∑
it
s s P  = revenue from sales of assets during period t, 
∑
it
p p P = cost of assets purchased during period t, 
Ω ∈ θ    = possible states of nature, 
t
i C     = initial endowment of cash in francs, 
i γ     = conversion rate of francs into dollars. 
The above dividend and payoff table and dollar redemption formula is public 
knowledge. By utilizing only two possible states and two types of traders the potential for 
an “information trap” is eliminated. The dividend paid to the assets for the two states is 
quite different from each other to reduce confusion.  
The expected, full-revealing rational equilibrium asset prices and asset holdings 
are: 
When state I occurs, price for asset A (B) is 300, Type X will hold asset A (B), 
When state II occurs, price for asset A (B) is 50, Type Y will hold asset A (B). 
However, in the rational expectations equilibrium without insider information the 
equilibrium asset price is independent of the realized state.  The prior information 
equilibrium is: 
price for asset A (B) is 162.5 and Type X will hold asset A (B). 
  94.2.  Treatment Variables 
 
The basic hypothesis motivating this experiment is that people trading in LSSM 
tend to read information from the price movements in one market as a relevant 
assessment of the fundamental factors of the asset they are trading in the other market.  
Therefore, the main treatment variable is the distribution of private information.   
In the baseline treatment (treatment 1), it is common knowledge that no one 
knows which state will prevail at the end of a trading period when dividends are declared.  
That is, there are no traders with “insider information.” 
Our hypothesis is that in the baseline treatment in both markets price will 
converge to the prior information rational equilibrium price (162.5).  While prices in both 
markets are expected to converge to the same equilibrium and, therefore, be correlated, 
absent inside information, there is no reason to expect any lead/lag structure in the 
correlation between the A and B price movements. 
In a second condition (treatment 2), there is a set of “insider traders” in one 
market who are told at the beginning of each trading period what state will prevail at the 
end of the period.  It is common knowledge that there are insiders, but their identities and 
the market in which they can participate is known only to the individuals who are 
provided with the inside information.  With the existence of inside information, the 
hypothesis is that both markets will converge to the fully revealing rational expectations 
equilibrium. Because the location of the ‘insiders’ is unknown, our hypothesis is that 
there will not be a strong lead/lag pattern of co-movements of the price of “A” and “B” 
shares.     
  10  11
In the third treatment (treatment 3), subjects are not only aware of the existence of 
the insiders, but also of the location of the group (or market) to which insiders belong.  
Our hypothesis is that prices will converge in both markets to the fully-revealing 
equilibrium price and that the movement of prices in the market with the insiders will 
lead the movement of prices in the other market. 
Table 2 describes the sessions we have run. 
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Table 2 Experimental Sessions 
Public Knowledge Distribution 
About Insiders 








Subjects  # of Trading 
Period 










3 12  Inexperienced, 
Pitt Undergrad 




State I: 300 
State II: 50 
State I: X 
State II: Y 
Mar. 19, 
2004 
1 12  Inexperienced, 
Pitt Undergrad 
14 No  No  Prior 
Information 




2 12  Inexperienced, 
Pitt Undergrad 
14 Yes  No  Full-
Revealing 
State I: 300 
State II: 50 
State I: X 




3 12  Inexperienced, 
Pitt Undergrad 




State I: 300 
State II: 50 
State I: X 




3 12  Inexperienced, 
Pitt Undergrad 




State I: 300 
State II: 50 
State I: X 




3 12  Inexperienced, 
Pitt Undergrad 




State I: 300 
State II: 50 
State I: X 
State II: Y 
May. 27, 
2004 
1 12  Inexperienced, 
Pitt Undergrad 
and Graduate 
15 No  No  Prior 
Information 
162.5  X 
  
5.  Experimental Results 
5.1.  Base Case:  Treatment One (No Insiders) 
Hypothesis 1:  Price Convergence to Prior Information Equilibrium Prices 
In this base treatment, no one has insider information.  Therefore, the rational 
expectation equilibrium price is 162.5 for each trading period regardless of realized state 
and in equilibrium Type X traders should hold all of the stock. 
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Figure 1 reports the average transaction prices for assets A and B in each trading 
period in the two sessions we ran for treatment 1.   
In each of the graphs in Figure 1, the horizontal axis shows the trading periods in 
each session, and the vertical axis presents the price levels.  The smooth line represents 
the predicted prior information equilibrium price and the other two lines with accentuated 
data points represent the average transaction prices for A and B in each trading period. 
Although the average transaction prices for assets A and B never reached 162.5, 
they remain above the expected value (100) for Type Y traders. Furthermore, the average 
transaction prices were independent of the realized state. 
 













Figure 2 shows the end of period holdings of stock by Type X traders. While 
competition amongst X types did not drive the price to the rational expectations 
equilibrium level, with experience it was sufficient to achieve a transfer of most of the 
stock to the Type X traders. The efficiency of the market can be measured by the ratio of 
the actual total dividends earned to the dividends that would have been earned in the prior 
information equilibrium.  By this measure, the average efficiency in the base case was  
.875 in the A market and .885 in the B market. 
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  145.2.  Markets with Traders That Have Inside Information 
Hypothesis Two: When it is common knowledge that there are traders who know 
the true state, the market price in both markets will tend to converge to the fully revealing 
information equilibrium price. 
5.2.1.  Treatment 3 (Insiders in one market with location of insiders commonly 
known) 
 














Figure 3 reports the average transaction prices and the predicted full-revealing 
equilibrium prices for the sessions we ran for Treatment 3.  
With experience, subjects reached the full-revealing equilibrium prices for almost 
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  15average transaction prices for state I and state II is getting larger and larger indicating 
that subjects were able to distinguish the two states and price assets accordingly as 
predicted by the full-revealing equilibrium.  This trend is especially clear after period 10 
for these 4 sessions.   
Average transaction prices for asset B not only track the average transaction 
prices for asset A, but also converge to the full-revealing equilibrium prices as well.  
Since subjects in B market have no private insider information about the current state of 
the trading period, this is strong evidence that the insider information migrates into the B 
market.  Informal interviews with subjects after each session confirmed that subjects in B 
market were watching the prices in A market closely and were able to successfully infer 
the true state of most trading periods.  
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  17While traders in the B market were able to extract information from the 
transaction prices in the A market, as Figure 4 shows, the end of period stock holdings in 
the A market conformed much more closely to the fully revealing equilibrium holdings 
than did the end of period holdings in the B market.  This suggests that the passage of 
information from one market to the other had a significant effect on the timing and 
volume of trading in the market in which there were no informed traders. Consequently, 
the efficiency of the market with the inside traders, as measured by the ratio of actual 
dividends earned to the dividends that would have been earned in the fully revealing 
equilibrium is considerably higher than the efficiency of the market with no inside 
traders.  In market A the efficiency was .940 while in market B it was .86. 
 
5.2.2.  Treatment 2 ( Insiders Whose Location is Unknown) 
 
In this treatment the traders with inside information were in Market A.  However, 
their location was private information. 
Figure 5: Average Transaction Prices for Treatment 2 
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  18Figure 5 shows the average transaction prices for each trading period for 
Treatment 2.  The average trading price in the A market tracked the fully revealing 
information equilibrium price from the very first period.   The B market’s prices were 
distinctively different before and after period 7.  Before period 7, B market prices stayed 
around a steady level that did not distinguish the two states.  But after some trading 
experience and learning, B market started to move closer to fully revealing equilibrium 
prices.   
The lack of common knowledge of the location of traders with inside information 
also had a differential effect on the efficiency of the distribution of stock holdings.  As 
Figure 6 shows, the end of period distribution of stock holdings conformed much more 
closely to the fully efficient pattern of holdings in Market A, where the traders with inside 
information were, in fact, located, than in market B.  In Market A, subjects earned 91% of 
the dividends that could have been earned, while in Market B subjects earned only 83% 
of the available dividends.  
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  195.3.  Lack of Information Transfer When Location of Insiders Was Common 
Knowledge 
While information was generally transferred from market A to market B when it 
was common knowledge that the insiders were in market A this did not occur in all 
periods. In some periods in Treatment 3 the average of B prices reached the “wrong” state 
or simply did not follow the prices in A market. 
It is useful to look at the within period dynamics in these cases to get a better 
understanding of the nature of information transfer. 
 
Figure 7  Informed Traders Successfully Prevent Information Leaking Until Late in a 
Trading Period 



























Figure 7 plots the sequence of transactions in period 2 of the March 18 session.  
In this period, the true state was I and the fully revealing equilibrium price was 300.  
Informed traders in A were able to prevent their information from affecting the 
transaction prices in the market A until late in the session.  Furthermore, after the first 
significant movement in the price in market A there was a long lull in trading in that 
market while a significant number of trades continued to be made in market B at a price 
in the neighborhood of the state II equilibrium price.  It was only after a sequence of  
  20transactions in market A occurred that trended away from the state II equilibrium price 
that the transaction prices in market B began to follow. 
In period 2 of the 5/26 night session the true state was I.  As shown in Figure 8, 
several trades were made in market A at prices in the neighborhood of the fully revealing 
equilibrium price.  However, these were interspersed with transactions that occurred at 
much lower prices, so that there was no clear trend in the prices in market A.  Absent a 
trend in market A, virtually all of the trades in market B took place as though no 
information was transmitted from market A to market B, even though all but two 
transactions in market A took place at much higher prices than in market B. 
Figure 8  No Clear Trend in Informed Traders’ Market 




























Low volume of trade in market A also seemed to inhibit the transfer of 
information from that market, where there were informed traders, to market B where 
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In both of these market periods displayed in Figure 9 the true state was II.  While all 
of the transactions that occurred in market A were in the neighborhood of the fully 
revealing equilibrium price, early in the period there were very few transactions made in 
the A market.  Transactions made in the B market appear to be unaffected by the A market 
transaction prices. 
 
Because there are a small number of traders, it is possible for one or two traders in 
a market to engage in transactions that have a large effect on the average of the 
transaction prices in a market.  This is reflected in the behavior of prices in market B in 
some periods in the 5/26 afternoon session. In periods 1 and 5 of that session the true 
state was II and the average transaction price in market A was in the neighborhood of the 
fully revealing equilibrium price.  By contrast, the average transaction price in market B 
was at least three times the fully revealing equilibrium price. In period 1 of May 26 there 
were 26 trades with prices over 100 in market B.  Out of these 26 trades, 7 were bought 
by subject 9 and 18 were bought by subject 10.  These two individuals’ transactions count 
for 25 out of 26 trades with price over 100.  If we exclude their behavior, the average of 
  22the remaining transaction prices of B is close to the fully revealing equilibrium price. 
These two subjects’ behavior induced the same pattern in period 5 of the same 
experimental session.  The equilibrium price should be 50, but there are 31 trades with 
prices over 100.  Out of these 31 transactions, 23 were bought by subject 9 (12 trades) 
and subject 10 (11 trades).   
5.4.  Real Time Transaction Data and the Direction of Information Transfer 
The fact that the average transaction price in Market A tends to track the fully 
revealing equilibrium price indicates that the information held by the informed traders in 
that market leaks out to other market participants.  Similarly, the fact that the average 
transaction prices in market B are highly correlated with those in market A suggests that 
information passes from market A to market B.  Another indicator of the transference of 
information is from the market with the informed traders, A, to the market with no 
informed traders, B, is the time at which the first transaction in the neighborhood of the 
fully revealing equilibrium price occurs in market A relative to time the first transaction 
in market B falls into the same interval.  We define T as the number of seconds left in a 
trading period when a transaction first occurs in the ε neighborhood of the fully revealing 
equilibrium price.  In Figure 10 below these times are plotted for both markets in all 
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In each graph in Figure 10, we plot the figures for TA and TB for each period and 
the value of T
B
A minus TB
B.  ε was chosen to be 5 for state II and 150 for state I.
7  If 
information flowed from A to B then most TAs should be greater than TBs.  In fact, the 
lines called “time difference”, which is simply (T
B
A  - TB
B), in Figure 16’s graphs lie above 
the horizontal axis for most periods.  The probabilities for TA to be greater than TB in the 
four sessions for treatment 3 are .73, .94, .82 and .59 respectively. 
B
                                                 
7 We have to increase the value of ε  for state I because transaction prices for most periods never reach the 
equilibrium price level 300 for state I.  If we narrow the interval, there won’t be any transaction price that 
falls into the interval.  We extended the intervals so that they are closer to the real average transaction 
prices. 
  246.  Conclusions  
We implemented an experiment to study the effect of information use and 
transference on asset pricing and portfolio composition between legally separated stock 
markets. Like previous studies, we find that the information of informed traders gets 
reflected in the price of the asset in which those traders participate. We also find, when 
the location of those traders with inside information is known, participants in the market 
without insider information are often able to infer the right state and therefore reach the 
full-revealing equilibrium. The quality and clarity of signals sent out by the market with 
insider information directly affects the ability of the other market to infer the true state.  
Furthermore, when the location of the inside traders is known to be fixed, but is private 
information, the transference of information is delayed until there emerges a strong 
correlation between the average transaction price in the market in which insiders 
participate and the true state.  
 These results provide theoretical support for the conjectures made by empirical 
studies on emerging capital markets that (some) domestic investors have better 
information than do foreign investors and that this difference in information induces the 
co-variance observed in price movements in assets that trade in legally separated markets. 
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We are about to begin an asset market experiment where you can trade assets using 
experimental currency.  The experiment is conducted in a computerized electronic 
market.  We will describe to you how this market works and your interface with it. 
 
Please raise your hand and talk to the experimenter if you don’t see the following screen 






The left upper corner of the screen shows you the current trading period and the total 
number of trading periods we are going to play today.  The right upper corner shows 
the remaining seconds of the current trading period.  In today’s experiment, each 
trading period is 5 minutes. 
 
The bottom of the screen displays your subject ID and the current currency you have 
in your portfolio. 
 
The rest of the screen is divided into two horizontal boxes, each for one specific asset.   
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There are two assets – A and B in today’s experiment.  On the left of each box, you 
will see the number of units of each asset in your portfolio.  The above window 
indicates that you have 1 unit of asset B in your portfolio right now. (The next 
column is where you type to submit offers to sell asst B, right next to it is the column 
of existing offers submitted to the market to sell asset B.  The middle column is the 
trading price for asset B.  The next column on the right is the existing offers 
submitted to the market to buy asset B.  The last column on the very right of the 
screen is where you work to submit offers to buy asset B.)  
      To place an offer to sell an asset, go to that asset’s box and type the price you want 
to sell in the cell under the label “Offer to Sell Stock x”.  Click the button “Submit 
offer to Sell Stock x” to send your offer.  Please note that you won’t be able to 
delete an offer after you submit it, so make sure the price you typed in is correct 
before you hit the submit offer button.  Your offer will be posted in the column of 
“Offers to Sell Stock x”, which is to the right of the column where you submitted 
your offer.  You can only trade one unit at a time, therefore there is no need to specify 
the quantity of assets in your offers.  Note that once you submit an offer either to buy 
or sell an asset, you are committed to that offer until either someone accepts the offer, 
or if no one accepts your offer, till the end of the current trading period. 
  Follow the same steps to place an offer to buy an asset, the columns to submit 
buying offers and the columns to show to all the subjects the current submitted 
buying offers are laid symmetrically to the right of the box for each asset. 
  The offers to sell assets are displayed in the descending order of the submitted prices 
while the offers to buy assets are displayed in the ascending order of the submitted 
prices. 
  Accepting an offer results in a trade.  If you would like to accept any of the offers 
(either to buy or sell an asset) submitted to the market, click the red button. 
 Note  that  accepting an offer from the column of  “Offers to Sell Stock x” means that 
you are buying that stock from the subject who submitted the offer, while accepting 
an offer from the column of  “Offers to Buy Stock x” means that you are selling that 
stock to the subject who submitted the offer at the specified price.   After the 
transaction, the corresponding units of asset you traded and the currency left in your 
portfolio will be updated and the trading price will be posted in the middle column of 
“Trading Price for Asset x”.  Meanwhile, the offer will be eliminated from the column 
of existing offers. 
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engage in trade.   
First, every subject is only allowed to one of the two kinds of assets only.  There are 
two groups of players: The first group is allowed to trade only asset A; the second 
group is allowed to trade only asset B.  You can tell from the initial endowment of 
assets in your portfolio to see which group you belong to.  If you are in the first 
group, you have units of asset A, but zero unit of asset B.  Because of the division of 
two groups, you cannot post any offers or trade the other two assets of the other 
group.  If you attempt to do so, you will get an error message informing you that you 
are not allowed to trade that particular asset.  However, you can view information on 
the offers and transactions of all two assets from your screen regardless which group 
you belong to. 
 
Second, you are also not allowed to trade with yourself, meaning that you cannot 
accept offers submitted by yourself.  If you do so, an error message will appear. 
Third, no short-sell is allowed, which means that if you don’t have enough units of 
asset, you can’t send out an offer to sell that many units. Similarly, you can’t place a 
buy order if you don’t have enough money left in your account.  An error message 
will show up to inform you the situation. 
Now let’s take a 2 period trading practice. 
Summary Screen: 
 
At the end of each trading period, a summary screen will pop up.  
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On this screen, you will see the following information: 
 
1)  Trading currency held in your portfolio at the end of the current trading period. 
2)  Dividends for both assets A&B and number of units of each asset held in your 
portfolio for the current period. 
3)  Total dividends you earned from the assets held in the current trading period. 
4)  Interest earned on trading currency held in your portfolio for the current trading 
period. 
5)  Total income in francs in your portfolio for the current trading period. 
6)  Dollars earned for the current trading period. 
7)  Accumulative dollars earned so far in the experiment. 
 
The experimenter will also announce a public report of the average transaction 
price for all assets A&B after the end of each trading period. 
 
You will be asked to record some of the above information on a record sheet provided to 
you at the end of this trading period.  After you are ready, click the “Please Wait” button 
to wait for all the other subjects to be ready to continue to the next trading period. 
 
Now let’s talk about the experiment you are about to participate in a few minutes. 
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There are altogether two assets in our experiment: A & B which will generate dividends 
at the end of each trading period.  The trading currency, money, will also generate 
interest returns.   
 
Note that each asset only “lives” for one trading period.  That is, your portfolio 
composition won’t be carried over to the next trading period.  In the beginning of each 
trading period, your endowment including both the assets and units of trading currency 
will return to the initial endowment.  That is, each subject will have 10 units of assets 
(either A or B depending which group you are in) and 3500 units of trading currency to 
begin for every trading period.  The only information will carry over is your 
accumulative earnings in dollar. 
 
At the end of each trading period, there will be a dividend paid to each unit of the assets 
you have in your portfolio.  The dividend of each asset paid to you is determined by 
which state occurred at the end of the 3-minute trading period and by which type of 
trader you are.  There are two possible states: state I and state II.  A random number 
drawn will determine which state will occur.  The probability of state I (II) observed is 
50%.  There are two types of traders in each group.  Half of the traders in each group are 
type X, while the other half is type Y.  The dividend information is shown below: 
 
For  type  X 
(in francs) 
            Dividend for A&B  for type Y 
(in francs) 
Return on money 
(in francs) 
ϑ1 = 50% Probability of state 1 
observed. 
300 150  1 
ϑ2 = 50% Probability of state 2 
observed. 
25 50  1 
Note: Asset A and B always have the exact same dividend at the end of each trading 
period.  
 
Note:  The dividend is measured in francs, not money (the trading currency).   
 
The conversion from the game to your real dollar payment is like this: 
 
  Money (what you                    dividend and                        converted  
 use to trade) and   interest earned   
assets in your portfolio                     in francs                     to dollars 
 
Your goal is to maximize the number of Dollars you can earn from each 
period!!!  We will go over some example to see how this works.   
  
In our experiment today, the conversion between points and dollars for each 
trading period is: Dollars Earned = 0.00025* (francs) 
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During the experiment, the experimenter may choose to introduce insider information to 
some subjects.  The insider information is the private information given to selected 
subjects and it informs those subjects before the beginning of the next trading period 
about the true state that will be observed at the end of the next trading period.  If some 
subjects receive such information, there will be a public announcement to all the subjects 
that some traders now begin to have insider information.  The experimenter may also 
choose to tell all of the subjects the location (e.g., which group) of the subjects with 
insider information. 
 
Summary of Important Points 
 
Before we start our practice trading game, let me remind you the important points: 
 
1)  You will find from your screen that you can only participate in one of the two 
markets: either A or B.  But you can always view information about both markets, 
including the one you can’t participate. 
 
2)  Asset A and B always have the same dividend payoff for every trading period. 
 
3)  Don’t forget the dividend information on assets and the one-franc return on 
trading currency: 
For  type  X 
(in francs) 
            Dividend for A&B  for type Y 
(in francs) 
Return on money 
(in francs) 
ϑ1 = 50% Probability of state 1 
observed. 
300 150  1 
ϑ2 = 50% Probability of state 2 
observed. 
25 50  1 
 
4)  You are paid not by francs you earn from each trading period, but by the number 
of US dollars converted from the francs you earn.   
 
5)  Your portfolio composition of assets and trading currency won’t carry over to the 
next trading period. 
 
6)  At the end of each 3-minute trading period, record your dividend francs, portfolio 
composition and the earnings in terms of dollars on the record sheet given to you. 
 
  During the experiment, the experimenter might choose to introduce insider 
information to certain subjects. 
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2.  Trading screen that subjects see on their computer: 
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